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BOOK REVIEWS
TRIAL OF PETER GRIFFITHS.

Edited by George Godwin. Pp. 219, appendices,

illustrations. London, William Hodge and Company, Limited, 1950. $3.50.
The usual motives of a murderer-gain, revenge, chance, deliberate elimination of an unwanted fellow human-can be applied to spiritual weaknesses and evil impulses common to us all. But there is another criminal drive
more difficult to comprehend, that of the psychopathic murderer whose personality urges and whose varied environmental circumstances lead him to commit
a horrible crime in a moment of uncontrolled lust. The Trial of Peter Griffiths concerns the latter instance and leaves to the reader the decision as to
whether a British court erred in declaring the criminal behavior of a
twenty-two year old, ex-Irish guardsman to have been that of a rational
being who had departed from the social norm, rather than that of a
mentally deranged schizophrenic.
The actual circumstances of Peter Griffiths' crime were clear and were
confirmed by the defense in every particular. On the night of May 15,
1948, a small girl had been stolen from her bed in the Queen's Park Hospital,
Blackburn, England, criminally assaulted and then brutally murdered.
The real issue in the trial was not whether the accused was guilty or not;
but whether, at the time the crime was committed, Griffiths' state of mind
was such that he was legally responsible for his criminal act.
Evidence introduced during the trial showed that Peter Griffiths was not
a madman in the sense of plain lunacy, but was insane in a way less obvious
to the average layman. His defense was that of schizophrenia or a "split
personality," wherein the accused had found reality too difficult and had
regressed into a shadowy world of fantasy, from which he temporarily emerged
in a moment of maniacal ferocity. George Godwin, who edited this volume
in the Notable British Trials Series, has organized in competent fashion the
court testimony seeking to determine whether the defendant's heredity,
personal history, environment, persistent infantilism, and job instability
placed him on the side of responsible sanity or in a position of irresponsible
insanity. Disagreements between legal and medical experts on the basic
question of whether Griffiths' was a schizophrenic and therefore not fully
accountable for his act point up clearly the fundamental differences in
the interpretation of the nature of the criminal mind as asserted by the law
on the one hand, and by the science of psychopathology on the other.
Although Mr. Godwin, himself a British lawyer, strongly suggests a miscarriage of justice, the court found Peter Griffiths to be legally sane and
sentenced him to death.
The volume contains valuable appendices detailing the medico-legal
nature of schizophrenia and suggests further readings upon the subject of
mental abnormality and crime.
HAROLD M. HEFrmAx
The Ohio State University
A STUDY OF EDUCATION AND CRnmn. By David Abrahcmsen. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1952. Pp. 340. $5.00.
Nothing new is presented in this essay. The sub-title is misleading, for the
book is not a report on a research "study," and only two of the twelve chapters are concerned with the relation between education and crime. In one of
those two chapters, incidentally, the author states, "In passing, let me say
that some may believe mentioning the schools is outside the domain of this
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book." (p. 263). Apparently directed primarily at the lay reader, the book
includes a rehash of portions of some of the author's earlier articles and books,
a recitation of the usual psychiatric opinions and arguments about delinquency
and crime, a reaffirmation of the dogma that psychiatrists alone can understand the criminal, and a number of what may be characterized as "thoughts
for the day."
Rather than clear insight into the etiology of criminal and delinquent behavior, we are given here a poorly organized repetition of psychiatric assumptions about such behavior. On the first page of the Foreword (p. vii) the
author uses "emotionally disturbed human being" and "delinquent human
being" synonymously, thus making the assumption that delinquents are, by
definition, emotionally disturbed persons. This assumption is restated many
times in many different forms. Thus, the author assumes in advance precisely
what we want to know, namely the extent to which emotional disturbances or
abnormalities are important in delinquency and crime.
Also, on page 125, the author indicates that he has never found an offender
who did not show some mental pathology, and he concludes that the normal
offender is a myth. Yet in other places he explicitly states that "it is extremely difficult to find an absolutely normal person" (p. 103), and that "it is
difficult if not impossible to determine accurately the influence of abnormal
mental processes in the motivation and execution of an act." (p. 143). If we
do not know who is normal, and if it is almost impossible to determine the
influence of abnormality on acts, criminal or otherwise, then it is logical to
conclude that we know practically nothing about the importance of abnormality in crime. But the author cannot draw this conclusion, since he already
has assumed the opposite. As a result, his book contains examples of a strange
kind of reasoning, sometimes couched in what is almost double-talk. Here are
three samples: (a) "When it comes to the point where there apparently are
no abnormal findings present, we cannot say how much pathology enters the
picture. . . . (p. 143). (b) "When I speak now of the criminal, I do not
mean the man who once commits an inconsequential offense. In my opinion
he is not so much an offender as he is a sufferer from some mental abnormalities, although the law might not say so." (p. 125). (c) "This man unconsciously wanted revenge for the insults he had suffered in early childhood
from his mother. This was strongly repressed in him because in all my examinations he never even gave a hint that he was trying to get at his mother."
(p. 198).
The psychiatric dogma that only psychiatrists can understand crime also
is expounded many times. (See, for example, pages 21, 50, 57, 123, 125, 126.)
Using an analogy with instruments used in physical and biological science, the
psychiatrist is considered as a kind of x-ray machine or microscope, available
for use by laymen and social scientists who ordinarily are unable to view the
invisible, unconscious, mysterious, mental "germs" which are said (by psychiatrists) to produce criminality. But if this book is considered a report on
what becomes observable ("instinctual manifestations," "emotional tensions,"
"mother fixations," and the like) through this kind of microscope, it may be
concluded that the lens must be both cloudy and misshapen. At least the
microscopes do not seem to have improved very much since the first microscope, Freud, and they do not seem to have the degree of precision necessary
for scientific research.
In addition to repeating psychiatric assumptions and arguments, the book
treats us to homely advice of the sort ordinarily reserved for poor boys about
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to go out into the cold, cruel world to seek their fortunes. We are told, for
example, that power-laden men really have great anxieties and frustrations
(p. 7), that genuine happiness is measured only by the happiness in one's
heart (p. 264), that if one believes in what he is doing and likes to do it he
cannot fail (p. 264), that "corruption is more dangerous than disease. The
mind may die of it." (p. 9). Although such "thoughts for the day" are
given relatively little space in the book (as compared to the space given to
discussion of such topics as "basic instincts," "emotional strivings," "family
tensions," "the Reality Principle," "criminal tendencies," and kindred concepts), their presence makes one curious about the extent to which the counsel
on criminological problems is based on a "folksy" philosophy of life, rather
than on scientific investigation.
In one place (p. 134), the author says that "there has been altogether too
much literature on the market-and bland acceptance of it, what's more-to
the effect that offenders act out their aggressions and therefore get rid of them
all." He makes this statement because he disagrees with the opinions advanced
in the literature. By the same token, since many persons will disagree with
almost all the opinions advanced here, it could be asserted that there is on the
market too much literature of the type represented by this book.
DONA-LD R. CREssEy
University of California,
Los Angeles
TRIL OF MARY QUEFN OF SCOTS. Edited by A. Francis Stewart. Pp. 201,
illustrations. 2d ed.; London and Edinburgh, William Hodge and Company, Ltd., 1951. $3.50.
Historians have long studied the bitter personal and political duel between
Queen Elizabeth of England and Mary Stuart, Queen of Scotland, a struggle
which ended in February, 1587 when Mary, proud and unyielding to the very
end, was led to the executioner's block. After nineteen agonizing years during
which Mary was a prisoner of her royal cousin, the contest for power moved
swiftly to a dramatic climax when the Stuart queen was tried for high treason.
Mary Queen of Scots, the political pawn of scheming European statesmen
and Papist plotters, was enticed into' a conspiracy formed by one Anthony
Babington to assassinate Elizabeth and welcome the Spaniards into England.
When all appeared to be ready, the conspirators were seized, and forcefully
compelled by torture to confess their guilt. By the terms of an Act of Association passed several years before, Mary's life was declared forfeit for
voluntarily entering into the plot. A special commission heard the evidence
and unanimously condemned the Scottish queen to be executed; Star Chamber
and Parliament confirmed the judgment; and, after a period of indecisive
hesitation, Elizabeth signed the death warrant.
Two points entered into the trial-the facts proving treason and the legality
of jurisdiction. The Crown spun a convincing web of circumstantial evidence,
some real but much that was distorted and fraudulent, that Mary had committed high treason against the state of England. The Scottish queen,
allowed no notes or legal counsel, ignorant of English law, and unaware of
the incriminating testimony that could be produced against her, disregarded
much of the factual evidence and based her defense upon vigorously challenging the legality of the entire proceedings. Arguing that no law or fellow
sovereign could touch her, an anointed queen, Mary Stuart maintained, in
her own words, "I have no other judge than God!" In her opinion, a royal
statement that the accusation and the corroborating documents were false

